Abstract
This is a review or 'precis' of the book "Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views," By James Beilby and Paul Eddy, Eds. This post addresses from the book four different perspectives on how God could know all things but yet allow free will and avoid being the Author of sin.
Introduction
Does God know all things? The Open Theism view answers the question
negatively, arguing God does not exhaustively settle or know all things future.[3]
Does God in His foreknowledge and
sovereignty preserve man's free agency? The
Augustinian-Calvinist view holds God decrees all things, leaving free will to
be understood through the lens of compatiblism.[4] Does God have freedom to act providentially
logically consequent to His divine decree?
Advocates of the Simple Foreknowledge view are not sure.[5] Presuming man has free agency, does God know
how free agents would behave in all possible circumstances? The Middle Knowledge view proposes a
mechanism to answer this question in the affirmative.[6]
The debate within contemporary
evangelicalism concerning divine foreknowledge engages significant theological
doctrines including the nature and mode of God's foreknowledge, the operative
mode of God's sovereignty, and whether mankind really has libertarian freedom
or not.[7]
Open Theism View
While God is sovereign over history, the
"Openness" view argues that Scriptural exegesis does not warrant the
conclusion that future events are "exhaustively" settled by God, or
even foreknown by Him![8] "Reality, in other words, is composed of
both settled and open aspects."[9] While God declares through the prophet Isaiah
that he "...declares the end from the beginning, and from long ago what is
not yet done...,"[10]
Boyd contends God settles some future events without settling all future being
events.
Open Theism View Supporting Arguments
Our own decision-making process reveals we presuppose it
is within our power to choose between different "possible futures."[11] Even physical reality exhibits a combination
of deterministic and quantum indeterministic properties demonstrating the
possibility all future events may not be settled.[12]
Language describing God exhaustively knowing the future
in Scripture are taken literally, yet passages referring to God regretting, or
changing His Mind, or pronouncing conditional curses or blessings, are
classically interpreted as figurative.
Boyd argues since the language is the same in both motifs, the different
interpretive approaches used is not justified.[13]
In passages where God expresses surprise,
regret, or frustration,[14]
Boyd argues interpreting these figuratively renders them meaningless.[15] For example if II Peter 3:9 is analogized, this
passage requires us to conclude God did not mean He wishes no one would perish,
and He has preordained people for hell.[16] "If it is difficult for the classical
view to explain why God strives with people He is certain will not be saved, it
is even more difficult to explain why God would create these people in the
first place."[17]
Several passages suggest conditional terms in God's
dealings with man[18],
where future counterfactuals were possible.
In Exodus 13:17, "God actually reveals His inner thoughts and
motives ─ things we would never know if He didn't tell us. And we find to some extent God thinks about
the future in terms of possibilities."[19] Boyd reasons that God uses passages like this
to teach that He can and does change His mind, and if those passages were
interpreted figuratively, they would be logically incoherent.[20]
Responses to Open Theism View
Hunt suggests Boyd
equivocates the term "settled" with "determined" regarding
future events, and confuses God's omnipotent power to make something happen with
knowing it will come to pass."[21]
Hunt agrees God may have left some
things causally open to happen, but He knows all things that will happen.[22] Hunt negates the Open Theism response to the
problem of evil with this query "The idea that God becomes aware of
contingent events only as they happen, just like we do, is supposed to make
God's failure to prevent horrendous evils somehow more comprehensible. But how?"[23]
Craig states if God knows certain counterfactuals, they
must be true.[24] Yet, "...since Boyd affirms divine
omniscience and yet denies that God knows future contingencies, he must hold
that such propositions are not true. If
such propositions are true, the Boyd's view undermines divine
omniscience."[25] Craig argues Open Theism denies that God has
complete knowledge of the future yet affirms He is omniscient, which fails the
logical principle of Bivalence.[26]
Helm contends the Open Theism view of scriptural
interpretation is flawed,[27] presupposing that God is mutable; it allows a
false philosophical construct to be employed in the interpretation of
Scripture.[28] Open Theism posits God's grace is causally
necessary but not sufficient to save without man's free will acceptance, which
Helm contends damages God's omnipotence as His will could then be frustrated by
sinful man.[29]
Simple Foreknowledge View
It is God's very nature to be all knowing, concerning
all truth in the past, present and future, knowing all truths and believing no
falsities, and containing no gaps to be filled in by future events.[30] Hunt asserts Simple Divine Foreknowledge (F) is
sufficient to refute objections without explanation as to how God knows the
future.[31] Hunt argues "...any alternative to
Simple Foreknowledge must be justified on the grounds other than its ability to escape the Problem of Human Freedom, the
Problem of Divine Agency and the Problem of Divine Providence."[32]
Simple Foreknowledge View Supporting Arguments
Hunt avers that while (F) is not precisely defined in
Scripture, dozens of examples show that God's knowledge is perfect; having a
complete apprehension of the future and what is presently happening, including
people's thoughts.[33] God is attributed supreme divine perfection, and
necessarily must have superlative knowledge, lacking in knowing anything that
is true for God achieve what He wills.[34]
Resolving the Problem of Human Freedom
Given God's infallible foreknowledge of a future event,
Hunt asserts this necessitates the event will happen, but that antecedent
knowledge of a future choice -- the "accidental necessity" of that
event -- does not violate free will.[35] Hunt rejects the Boethian view that God is
atemporal and sees everything "presently," because it denies (F).[36] Hunt also argues that where the Calvinist view
asserts that, apart from God, man will always freely choose according to his
sin nature, this denies free agency because any choice that is made is causally
contingent on God.[37]
Hunt dismisses the Ockhamist argument,
showing that "soft facts" essentially assert that God is not
omniscient if it were possible for Him to believe something that was not real
or potentially untrue.[38] Hunt agrees with the Augustinian-Calvinist view
that even when a free agent's choices are restricted to what God foreknows, they
remain morally accountable.[39] Hunt avers that God does not cause something "necessarily"
by knowing it, as in the case of Adam's sin, "God's believing that Adam
will sin depends on Adam's future sinning and not the other way around."[40]
Resolving the Problem of Divine Agency
The objection raised is that by knowing the future
already, God is "limited" to act only on what He knows of the future.[41] Hunt uses an analogy of watching a video of
your future that necessarily compels you to live out the future you have seen. He dismisses the
"intention-acquisition" dilemma by noting that while God is an
intentional agent, even with propositional knowledge of what "will come to
pass," God retains the power to decide what to do practically, and that
God's omniscience only determines the propositional belief, not God's free
agency to act.[42]
Resolving the Problem of Divine Providence
The problem presents God as unable to respond to prayer
"contrary to fact" of events in the future He foreknows.[43] Possessing information about the future
contrary to fact does not limit free agency, as Hunt explains "...only its
use can generate explanatory
loops."[44] He argues that God's inability to employ His
foreknowledge providentially would not prove (F) false, but further doctrinal
analysis is needed to resolve this given God's maximal excellence and
omnipotence.[45]
Responses to the Simple Foreknowledge View
Boyd contends Simple Foreknowledge limits providential
control by committing all future events known by God to be "necessarily"
fixed.[46] Boyd rejects Hunt's use of the Frankfurt
analogy to explain how Simple Foreknowledge can logically coexist with man's
free agency. The analogy ignores mental
processes of the actors, and by overriding their decisions, destroys the
actor's free agency.[47]
Craig rebuts Hunt's analogy that purports to prove that
fatalism is true and that every past event is now "necessary," rendering
impossible any act that would make God's knowledge of that future event in the
past now untrue.[48] Craig argues this does not prove fatalism is
true because God is aware of future contingent propositions, and as they
transpire to an actualized truth, they no longer are held as future conditional
propositions.[49] This, Craig contends, does not
"lock" the future deterministically based on past "future"
knowledge of counterfactuals held by God.[50] Craig continues that since Hunt contends a
causal link exists between God's foreknowledge of an event and a person's
ability to do "A" or fail to do "A," Simple Foreknowledge
is not compatible with free agency.[51]
By denying the PAP in defense of Simple Foreknowledge,
Helm contends Hunt is committed to some form of determinism that is not
identified by Hunt.[52]
As a result, the claim by Hunt that the Augustinian-Calvinist
view is fatalistic would also apply to the Simple Foreknowledge view.[53] From Hunt's original conclusion that PAP is
incompatible with human freedom, Helm then argues that since causal determinism
is also incompatible with PAP, causal determinism must then be compatible with
human freedom.[54] Helm challenges Hunt's charge that the
Augustinian-Calvinist view is fatalistic, since Simple Foreknowledge also
denies indeterministic free will, it would also be fatalistic.
Middle Knowledge View
The Middle Knowledge view attempts to explain God's
omniscience not in just the terms of what will
happen and what could have happened,
but also what would have happened
(counterfactuals) in the future had other world circumstances been in effect.[55] The Middle Knowledge view contends God has
full and unhindered knowledge of all counterfactuals, which have the property
of the antecedent or consequent clauses of a statement being contrary to fact.[56]
Logical Properties of Middle Knowledge
Logically prior to God's decree of creation, He had natural
knowledge of all necessary truths, including all possible future events ─ or
what possibly could be.[57] Logically subsequent to God's creative
decree, God has free knowledge of all potential contingent truths about
creation ─ what will be, past,
present, and future.[58] Where then does God's knowledge logically
exist of what would be?
Dominican theologians postulated God's
knowledge of counterfactuals was logically subsequent to the creative decree,
because prior to the creative decree, no counterfactuals were knowable.[59] Jesuits including Luis de Molina maintained
God's knowledge of counterfactuals was logically prior to the divine decree. They argued the Dominican position would
destroy free agency if the divine decree logically preceded God's knowledge of
counterfactuals because God would have decreed all possible actions.[60] Placing God's knowledge of counterfactuals
logically prior to His divine decree allows free agency without hindering God in
arranging circumstances to achieve His Will.[61]
Middle Knowledge View Supporting Arguments
Craig cites biblical examples such as the warning to
Zedekiah if he does not surrender to the Babylonians.[62]
Isaiah, Amos, and Jonah were given
prophecies that were counterfactuals to what actually happened.[63] Jesus told Pilate "If my kingdom were of
this world my followers would fight..."[64] Since it is logically impossible for God to
believe falsities, counterfactuals must be "potentially true" in some
circumstance, which Craig cites as scriptural evidence of middle knowledge.
Craig responds to fatalist reasoning stating Middle
Knowledge corrects the logical fallacy that what God foreknows must
'necessarily' happen.[65]
This according to Craig limits God free
action, placing Him in a temporally contingent position.[66] The Molinist perspective affirms the
conceptualist model where God necessarily has perfect knowledge of what will
actually happen, and what possibly could have happened consequent to the divine
decree, and simply discerns which truths are necessary and which are
counterfactual.[67] The causal relationship between God's true
belief of all true propositions (His free knowledge), and the possible choices
available to the free agent (natural knowledge) are severed, removing any need
for a temporal necessity.[68]
The Middle Knowledge view is also a superior explanation
for God's free actions of Providence while preserving the free agency of
sentient creatures.[69] Simple Foreknowledge proponents must grapple
with free knowledge prior to His decree because the choice of certain
circumstances could 'foreordain' men to choose evil.[70] Without knowing logically prior to His decree
what free agents 'would do' (His natural knowledge) God would only have
providential freedom to act posterior to His decree to foreordain what He knows
'will be' (His free knowledge), thus emptying any meaning of the concept of
foreordination.[71]
Craig then addresses an Open Theism philosophical
argument that God is not able to know future contingencies. This 'truth maker' argument states that a
proposition is not true unless it is actualized in reality, and by deduction,
counterfactuals cannot be true.[72] Craig responds that factually true
propositions can be found that do not have 'reality' as a property because they
are negations ─ such as "dinosaurs are extinct," and therefore the
'truth maker' argument fails.[73]
Responses to the Middle Knowledge View
Boyd argues the Middle Knowledge view never explains how
counterfactuals can be true propositions if neither God nor creaturely agents
ever willed them to be so.[74] Hunt contends Middle Knowledge never
addresses the problem of evil, given that the majority of people will reside in
hell; God was somehow rendered unable to solve this problem.[75] Hunt questions the philosophical basis of counterfactuals
because both the antecedent presumes what is not true, but then relies on the
consequent to follow with what is true.[76] Helm clarifies that God's knowledge of
counterfactuals only applies to the actual world, logically subsequent to His
decree, and that Middle Knowledge does not resolve the difficulty of fatalism
by simply arguing that God chose the world where these counterfactual events
did not happen.[77]
Augustinian-Calvinist View
The Augustinian-Calvinist view contends divine
foreknowledge is logically coherent with the compatibilist view of human
freedom, and if accepted, removes the need to resolve any conflict between God's
foreknowledge and deterministic free agency.[78] God's knowledge is the cause of all things;
what He causes, He permits because there is no distinction between His
knowledge and His Will.[79] God's foreknowledge is simply His knowledge
of what He has decreed before it takes effect ─this is coextensive with divine
foreordination, but differs in meaning.[80]
Augustinian-Calvinist View Supporting Arguments
Scripture that pictures God as surprised, forgetful, or
reacting to human choices must necessarily be interpreted metaphorically.[81] Scripture teaches God ordains everything that
happens, even actions of omission or evil by humans, yet those sinners are
still accountable for all decisions made under their control.[82] The responsibility of compatibilistic free
agents resides between two fixed points ─ under God who judges thoughts and
intentions, and human agents who judge actions.[83]
Since the characteristics of God's
relationship to man is unparalleled in human experience, we cannot fully
understand it or deny the logical coherence between God's foreordination of
events and human accountability for their actions.[84]
Foreknowledge, Freedom and Divine Grace
Helm argues divine Grace is consistent with compatiblism
and that human actions are free 'in a sense' that is consistent with
determinism.[85] The incompatibilist view holds God's grace is
causally necessary, but not sufficient for saving faith; a choice must be made
by the incompatibilist free agent to accept that grace.[86] The compatibilistic view is that grace is
irresistible and alone causally sufficient.[87] Incompatibilism requires the free agent to
act outside of their sin nature and ranks man's inalienable freedoms equal to
God's power to save.[88]
The Augustinian-Calvinist view posits
that "...with such freedom, God's saving grace is always resistible, and
so saving grace can never ensure its intended effect."[89]
The maximal definition of God's omniscience is congruent
with the compatibilist view because 'indeterministic free actions" would
necessarily be outside the realm of God's knowledge to actualize or govern.[90] Helm responds to the argument from Middle Knowledge
that these counterfactual propositions are merely conditional selections, which
God has not chosen to actualize.[91]
God's Righteousness and Knowledge of Evil
As God acts in the highest and holiest purpose, He
permits actions that are evil by removing His controlling influence and
allowing human nature to rule.[92] Incompatibilist objections are not persuasive
on this issue because they cannot explain why humans always will choose evil in
a wholly good world created by God.
"Accounting for the arrival if evil in a world created good by
God...the Augustinian says that the removal of God's hand led to the
encroachment of evil ─ to the operation of a causal force arising from a
deficiency ─ that God is not and could not Himself be the author ."[93] "So a God who is essentially strongly
omniscient positively governs all acts that occur except those which are evil,
and He negatively governs evil acts by knowingly and willingly permitting
them."[94]
The incompatibilist model cannot be true since
God foreknows our future actions in the past, they must necessarily happen in
order to by true in God's Mind.[95] God foreknows 'soft' or 'temporally' true
events in the future, and since His knowledge is infallible, they are
'hard" facts to Him, negating the incompatibilist free will argument.[96]
Responses to the Augustinian-Calvinist View
Affirming libertarian free agency, Boyd argues the Augustinian-Calvinist
view has "...God Himself [choosing] to save some and not others..."
and that this contradicts scriptural teaching that "God's love is
universal and impartial..."[97]
and that "if it was only up to God to choose who would be saved, we have
every reason to believe He would choose
everyone."[98] Hunt argues that compatiblism is incoherent
with moral responsibility, and that the Augustinian-Calvinist view takes the
extreme position that man 'cannot' want to do God's will in any situation in
his fallen state ever.[99]
Finally, Craig argues that the Augustinian-Calvinist
attempt to reconcile compatiblism with God's foreknowledge is misguided.[100] God offers an escape for temptation
(I Cor 10:13) which presupposes free agency to pray for grace.[101] Without Middle Knowledge, "...how can
God know what creatures would do were He to withdraw His steadying hand?"[102] Craig concludes the Augustinian-Calvinist
view must presume upon some form of secondary causes to explain free agent
decisions, which is logically inconsistent with compatiblism and divine
providence.[103]
[1]
James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy, eds. Divine
Foreknowledge: Four Views (Carlisle, Cumbria, UK: Paternoster Press, 2002)
[2]
Based on text only, without counting headers and footnotes.
[3]
Gregory A. Boyd, "The Open Theism View," Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, eds. James K. Beilby and Paul R.
Eddy (Carlisle, Cumbria, UK: Paternoster Press, 2002), p. 17
[4]
Paul Helm, "The Augustinian-Calvinist View," Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, eds. James K. Beilby and Paul R.
Eddy (Carlisle, Cumbria, UK: Paternoster Press, 2002), pp.162-163 synthesized
and summarized.
[5]
David Hunt, "The Simple Foreknowledge View," Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views,
eds. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Carlisle, Cumbria, UK: Paternoster
Press, 2002), p. 101
[6]
William Craig, "The Middle-Knowledge View," Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views,
eds. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Carlisle, Cumbria, UK: Paternoster
Press, 2002), p. 143 synthesized and summarized
[7]
Beilby, p. 9
[8]
Boyd, "The Open Theism View," pp. 13-14 synthesized and summarized
[9]
Ibid., p. 14
[11]
Boyd "The Open Theism View," p. 17
[12]
Ibid., p. 19
[13]
Boyd "The Open Theism View," p. 23, see also footnote 12
[14]
Ibid., pp. 24-26 Boyd cites Isaiah 5:4-5, and Jeremiah 3:6-7, 3:19:20, 7:31,
19:5 and 32:35 where God expresses surprise, regret in Genesis 6:6 for man's
descent into depravity, and frustration in I Samuel 13:13 when His plans to
bless Saul's family for future generations go unfulfilled.
[15]
Ibid., pp. 26-26
[16]
Ibid., pp. 28-29 synthesized and summarized
[17]
Ibid., p. 29
[18]
Ibid., pp. 30-31 Boyd references Exodus 13:17, Jeremiah 26:3, Ezekiel 12:3, 1
Chronicles 2:15, and Matthew 26:39 as instances where God thinks of the future
in terms of possibilities and not settled
[19]
Ibid., p. 31
[20]
Ibid., pp. 34-35, synthesized and summarized
[21]
Hunt "A Simple Foreknowledge Response," p. 49
[22]
Ibid., p. 50, 53
[23]
Ibid., p. 53
[24]
Craig "A Middle-Knowledge Response," p. 55
[25]
Ibid., p. 53
[26]
Ibid., p. 57 [for any proposition P, P is either true or false]
[27]
Helm "An Augustinian-Calvinist Response," pp. 61-63
[28]
Ibid., p. 63
[29]
Helm "An Augustinian-Calvinist Response," p. 64
[30]
Hunt "The Simple Foreknowledge View," pp. 65-66, synthesized and
summarized
[31]
Ibid., p. 67
[32]
Ibid., p. 68
[33]
Ibid., p. 68, summarized
[34]
Ibid., p. 69
[35]
Ibid., pp. 72-78, synthesized and summarized
[36]
Hunt "The Simple Foreknowledge View," pp. 78-79 summarized
[37]
Ibid., p. 79
[38]
Ibid., pp. 82-86 summarized
[39]
Ibid., pp. 88-89 (Hunt cites Augustine, The
Predestination of the Saints, 10.19)
[40]
Ibid., p. 90
[41]
Ibid., p. 91
[42]
Ibid., pp. 91-96
[43]
Hunt "The Simple Foreknowledge View," p. 96
[44]
Ibid., p. 100
[45]
Ibid., p. 101
[46]
Boyd "An Open-Theism Response," p. 107
[47]
Ibid., p. 108
[48]
Craig "A Middle-Knowledge Response," p. 108
[49]
Ibid., p. 108
[50]
Craig "A Middle-Knowledge Response," p. 110
[51]
Ibid., p. 113
[52]
Helm "An Augustinian-Calvinist Response," pp. 115-116
[53]
Ibid., p. 117
[54]
Ibid., p. 116
[55]
Craig, "The Middle-Knowledge View," p. 119-121 synthesized and
summarized
[56]
Craig, "The Middle-Knowledge View," p. 120
[57]
Ibid., p. 121
[58]
Ibid., p. 121
[59]
Ibid., p. 121
[60]
Ibid., p. 122
[61]
Ibid., p. 122
[62]
Ibid., pp. 123-124 (Jeremiah 38:17-18 is
cited)
[63]
Craig, "The Middle-Knowledge View," p. 124 (Isaiah 38:1-5, Amos 7:1-6, and Jonah 3:1-10
are cited)
[64]
Ibid., p. 123 (John 18:36 paraphrased)
[65]
Ibid., p. 126
[66]
Ibid., p. 127
[67]
Ibid., pp. 131-133 summarized
[68]
Ibid., p. 131
[69]
Ibid., p. 134
[70]
Ibid., p. 135
[71]
Craig, "The Middle-Knowledge View," p. 136
[72]
Ibid., p. 139
[73]
Ibid., pp. 139-142 synthesized and
summarized
[74]
Boyd, "An Open-Theism Response," p. 145
[75]
Hunt, "A Simple-Foreknowledge Response," pp. 151-153 summarized
[76]
Ibid., p. 153
[77]
Helm, "An Augustinian-Calvinist Response," pp. 156-158 summarized
[78]
Helm, "The Augustinian-Calvinist View," p. 162
[79]
Ibid., p. 163
[80]
Ibid.
[81]
Ibid., p. 165
[82]
Ibid.
[83]
Ibid., p. 166
[84]
Ibid., p. 169
[85]
Helm, "The Augustinian-Calvinist View," p. 169
[86]
Ibid., pp. 169-170 synthesized and
summarized
[87]
Ibid., p. 170
[88]
Ibid., pp. 170-171
[89]
Ibid., p. 170
[90]
Ibid., p. 175
[91]
Ibid.
[92]
Ibid., p. 176
[93]
Helm, "The Augustinian-Calvinist View," p. 177
[94]
Ibid., pp. 178,179
[95]
Ibid., p. 184
[96]
Ibid., p. 187
[97]
Boyd, "An Open-Theism Response," p. 191 summarized
[98]
Ibid., p. 193 [emphasis in original
quote]
[99]
Hunt, "A Simple-Foreknowledge Response," pp.198-200
[100]
Craig, "A Middle-Knowledge Response," p. 203
[101]
Ibid., p. 202
[102]
Ibid., p. 205
[103]
Ibid.
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